We are hearing a lot about President Obama's meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Netanyahu, a rabid right winger who was forced out of power in a corruption scandal some years ago (in Israel even Richard Nixon would have been allowed to run again after taking some time off) has pledged to (among other things) expand West Bank settlements, destroy Hamas and take a hard line against Palestinians. One thing he has scrupulously avoided saying is 'two state solution,' even though his predecessors (most notably Yitzhak Rabin) firmly committed towards pursuing the creation of a Palestinian state.
Let's hope that behind the scenes President Obama (who wants to see a fully independent Palestinian state up and running before he leaves the White House) wins the argument that he is surely having with Bibi.
And I am saying this as someone who has consistently defended the right of Israel to defend itself when attacked. It is certainly true that Israel has fought seven wars in its sixty years, and it is no secret that there are some in the middle east (including some Palestinians) who are implacably set on its destruction and the destruction of its citizens, and who will never be anything else. There are those in Israel who have feared, with some justification, that an independent Palestinian state would simply function as a base from which terrorists and armies could launch attacks against Israel. Nevertheless the best chance that Israel has to survive is to support the independence of Palestine (more on that below.)
The paranoid view that a lot of Israelis (especially those who support Netanyahu) have is best expressed in a column in Ha'aretz by Yehuda ben-Meir:
The sad truth is that the State of Israel will face a confrontation with the Obama administration, irrespective of the public outcome of the meeting between the U.S. president and Israel's prime minister....
It isn't pleasant, but anyone reading between the lines is beginning to understand that the Obama administration is becoming increasingly like the Carter administration. For 30 years, Israel has not had to deal with as difficult - sometimes even hostile - a U.S. administration as the Carter one. I can personally attest to the brutal style and blatant threats that characterized the relationship between Jimmy Carter and Menachem Begin. Indeed, Carter is someone whose beginnings can be seen in the way he has ended up.
OK, rebutting that will lead to why Israel must negotiate seriously and with the goal of an independent Palestinian state.
First off, let's even suppose that what Meir is claiming about Jimmy Carter were true. The fact is, Carter secured (however he did it) a lasting peace between Egypt and Israel. Egypt, with a much larger population base and army than Israel could ever hope to put in the field, was always Israel's most dangerous enemy. Fortunately for the Israelis the Egyptians fought poorly in each of the four wars between the two nations, but to assume that your opponent will always perform as poorly as they have in the past is foolish. In exchange for returning the occupied Sinai peninsula back to Egypt, Israel secured its first lasting peace with one of its neighbors. It is hard to argue that continuing to fight periodic wars with Egypt would have served Israeli interests at all. Having peace along its southwestern border has served Israel pretty well. Jordan later followed Egypt's lead, giving Israel peace along most of its eastern border as well. So his point about Carter is irrelevant-- what Carter did has been a real benefit to Israel. If he had to drag Begin kicking and screaming to the negotiating table, well then that's one of the best things Carter ever did-- and it's one of the best things that anyone ever did for Israel.
Second, let's consider the consequence of the fact that the Bush administration gave Israel carte blanche for eight years to do as it pleased. It would be almost impossible to argue that the last eight years have improved Israeli security. Israel has fought two wars against non-state organizations, Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas last year, and both of them are still alive and kicking after surviving several weeks of Israeli assaults, and both have shown their ability to launch thousands of rockets deep inside Israel. Israel has not weakened Hezbollah at all and while they arguably weakened Hamas militarily they did nothing to weaken Hamas' hold on the Gaza strip.
In fact, the only real gain that Israel has made in improving their security is a consequence of something that they had no control over, the death of Yassir Arafat. In 2001 as Bush took office you may recall they were fighting a new 'intifada' in the West Bank. This began shortly after Arafat walked away from a Clinton negotiated peace deal with Ehud Barak that came tantalizingly close to fruition. A Palestinian friend of mine told me that the reason was because most Palestinians thought Arafat was a joke who had robbed the Palestinians of billions of dollars (and after he died it was found that what the people thought was true, and that in fact Arafat had accumulated a fortune in banks around the world-- money that could have only come from the Palestinian treasury since he had little other income.) As my friend told me, "Arafat has the authority to say 'yes'" In other words Palestinians would only support him as far as he was willing to condone whatever they did anyway. So having no ability to control his own 'supporters' the Israelis were justified in their concern that any agreement they reached with Yassir Arafat would probably be violated, whether by his own choice or because what his choice was didn't matter.
In contrast, current Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has proven that he can adequately police the West Bank. During both the Hezbollah and Hamas wars it is noteworthy that there were no rockets fired from the west bank into Israel nor were there attacks there on Jewish settlers (though both Hezbollah and Hamas urged west bank Palestinians to rise up in support of their cause.) By keeping the west bank calm and quiet even during a war in which Israel was being attacked, Abbas has shown that he is exactly the partner that Israel needs for negotiations-- someone who can be trusted to keep and enforce his side of the agreement.
The alternative is endless war. The Palestinian issue isn't going anywhere as long as there is no Palestinian state. The broad agreement is already in place, via the Oslo accords and general consensus that the borders will likely follow the 1967 cease fire lines.
And in a turn about, it is now the Palestinians who have a leader who can be trusted, and the Israelis who (as one Israeli politician once said about the Palestinians) are taking the opportunity to miss an opportunity.
Showing posts with label Mahmoud Abbas. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mahmoud Abbas. Show all posts
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
Could the opportunity for peace come out of a war?
Once again, it seems like there are no winners but some real losers in the Palestinian civil war that has ripped the not-yet-born state into two pieces.
Mahmoud Abbas, who was elected President of the Palestinian authority, and Hamas, which by the same voters was elected to lead the government, have in the end not been able to work together. Not just with Israel, but not even with each other. Hamas has seized complete control of the Gaza strip while Fatah has done the same in the West Bank. Because the two pieces of Palestine are separated by Israel, it seems unlikely that there will be any other resolution to this than a 'two state solution,' but not the 'two state solution' that most had evisioned.
I had written a post following Hamas' surprising victory last year, Interpreting the Hamas victory and where from here, in which I had written that there might be cause for optimism because unlike the corruption plagued and weak structure of Fatah, Hamas could, if they could be induced to sign an agreement, back it up.
Ah, but that is the sticking point. I was far too optimistic, because while there is no question that Hamas has the authority that they could enforce an agreement, they have no inclination to make one. They still have one and pretty much only one goal-- to destroy Israel. And no price-- even the partitioning of the Palestinian state itself, is too high for them to pay in order to get rid of Israel. Like the medieval crusaders, Hamas risks simply becoming a cause without a plan, other than simply to push the cause forward-- and like the crusaders it is playing a very dangerous game, likely to end up in a bloodbath of Biblical portions, including both Israeli and Palestinian blood.
Fatah is probably a bit stronger and less corrupt than it was under Arafat (mainly because of the hard realities of the situation, as well as the fact that it would be hard to match Arafat for corruption, a man who stole billions in western donations while his people starved) but I can't say that I share the optimism that western leaders have that Mahmoud Abbas will be any more effective than Arafat at preventing individuals and organizations from carrying out attacks on Israel. To be honest, Hamas was able to make their one year cease fire with Israel that they observed up until last summer hold because they have a reputation for ruthlessness that Fatah lacks. Nevertheless recent events have clarified the situation and made it clear that Abbas and Fatah will be Israel's negotiating partner.
Israel is in the most interesting position. Of course if Israel does nothing it benefits (and has been benefitting) in the short term while the two Palestinian factions do their best to destroy each other. However, in the long term Israel faces some hard choices. Presumably now that Abbas has formed a government that does not include Hamas (in other words, a government which other than himself was never elected by the people) Israel is free to negotiate (since they had refused to negotiate with a government including Hamas because of Hamas' refusal to recognize Israel).
To begin with the Palestinian authority and Israel, which recognized each other after the Oslo accords, are willing to reiterate that agreement, but what next? Israel has built settlements in the past and is willing to dismantle them as they did in Gaza-- but what happened in Gaza, which has provided a base for rocket and mortar attacks and resulted in Israel re-invading certain areas in brief forays (as well as a protracted incursion last summer) suggests that simply dismantling the settlements as good-will gestures is as likely as not to simply turn them into launching pads for rockets aimed at Israeli population centers. Israel may indeed dismantle settlements, but the price is likely to be steep-- likely including acceptance of the Israeli border wall (which I oppose incidentally-- for the same reasons I oppose a border wall on the Mexican border-- but realistically, the Israelis are unlikely to tear it down given its record of stopping suicide bombers) and possibly some concessions in other areas-- more on that later. However, it is clearly to Israel's advantage to have a secure border along the West Bank area, just as Israel presently has secure borders along two borders which were once battle zones: Israel's borders with Jordan and Egypt. So Israel does have a motivation to reach an agreement that will allow a Fatah led state to come together and develop economically and politically. However, even if an accord is reached, there is still the thorny issue of what to do about east Jerusalem. Both sides claim it as their capitol, and the one thing that Jews, Muslims and Christians agree on is that the temple mount (now adorned with the mosque of Omar, the third holiest site in Islam) is holy ground. The holiest site in Judaism is the western wall of the temple of Herod, the same temple where Jesus preached and which was destroyed by the Romans in A.D. 70. I suspect that in the absence of other considerations, Israel would retain control over the holy sites only because of the fact of the matter, that Israel controls them now and won't give them up, and this would be part of the price Abbas would have to agree to in exchange for the dismantling of settlements elsewhere. However, the Israelis could offer to put portions under joint control, IF they had a real reason why they needed to gain goodwill, especially from West Bank Palestinians. And there is a reason they will.
The reason is quite plain. Israel will certainly be fighting a two front war in the very near future. In the past, Israel's reputation for military effectiveness saved it from actually having to fight any real wars since the end of the Lebanon invasion in 1982. But last summer, Hezbollah fought Israel to a draw. In the politics of the Middle East, that equals a victory for Hezbollah and a defeat for Israel. Hezbollah, which fired thousands of rockets all over northern and north-central Israel in last year's war has re-armed themselves and will sooner or later (with 'sooner' being more likely) go to war again with Israel. Not surprisingly, as we've seen recently, al-Qaeda also quickly has gotten into the scene, with Lebanese army units fighting to dislodge them from bases in southern Lebanon-- a place where until a few months ago al-Qaeda had no interest in.
However, with Hamas now firmly in control of the Gaza strip, we can anticipate that such a war will be a two front war. Hamas remains committed absolutely to the destruction of Israel so it is a certainty that at some point, they will use the complete control of the area which they now have to organize and conduct a concerted attack on Israel. It is hard to imagine that whether Hezbollah or Hamas attacks first, the other won't quickly join in. Or perhaps Israel, knowing this will happen, will attack both Hamas and Hezbollah directly-- hoping to gain enough militarily from a first strike to offset the political price they would pay for it.
And that is where Fatah and Abbas' opportunity comes in. They could of course mount an attack as well on Israel, but unlike Hamas and Hezbollah, Fatah's roots as a guerilla organization are long since past, and they would be quickly crushed by the Israeli army if they were so foolish. However, they could extract a high price from Israel in exchange for remaining neutral (since the last thing that Israel would want while fighting a two-front war would be for it to become a three-front war-- with the everpresent concern that Syria could also open a fourth front). In particular, that might be the card that Fatah would need to get rid of all the settlements, and possibly gain a joint control agreement over east Jerusalem. At the same time, a Palestinian authority which remained neutral (including reigning in its military arm, the al-Aqsa martyr's brigade) while Israel was fighting another major war would go a long way towards convincing Israel that the time was right for full Palestinian statehood.
It has been said of the Palestinians in the past that 'they never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.' Of course that was when Yassir Arafat was leading them from disappointment to disappointment to disappointment. The next few months will tell whether Abbas will be able to seize the opportunity and create a peaceful and stable state in the West Bank or go the way of Arafat before him.
Mahmoud Abbas, who was elected President of the Palestinian authority, and Hamas, which by the same voters was elected to lead the government, have in the end not been able to work together. Not just with Israel, but not even with each other. Hamas has seized complete control of the Gaza strip while Fatah has done the same in the West Bank. Because the two pieces of Palestine are separated by Israel, it seems unlikely that there will be any other resolution to this than a 'two state solution,' but not the 'two state solution' that most had evisioned.
I had written a post following Hamas' surprising victory last year, Interpreting the Hamas victory and where from here, in which I had written that there might be cause for optimism because unlike the corruption plagued and weak structure of Fatah, Hamas could, if they could be induced to sign an agreement, back it up.
Ah, but that is the sticking point. I was far too optimistic, because while there is no question that Hamas has the authority that they could enforce an agreement, they have no inclination to make one. They still have one and pretty much only one goal-- to destroy Israel. And no price-- even the partitioning of the Palestinian state itself, is too high for them to pay in order to get rid of Israel. Like the medieval crusaders, Hamas risks simply becoming a cause without a plan, other than simply to push the cause forward-- and like the crusaders it is playing a very dangerous game, likely to end up in a bloodbath of Biblical portions, including both Israeli and Palestinian blood.
Fatah is probably a bit stronger and less corrupt than it was under Arafat (mainly because of the hard realities of the situation, as well as the fact that it would be hard to match Arafat for corruption, a man who stole billions in western donations while his people starved) but I can't say that I share the optimism that western leaders have that Mahmoud Abbas will be any more effective than Arafat at preventing individuals and organizations from carrying out attacks on Israel. To be honest, Hamas was able to make their one year cease fire with Israel that they observed up until last summer hold because they have a reputation for ruthlessness that Fatah lacks. Nevertheless recent events have clarified the situation and made it clear that Abbas and Fatah will be Israel's negotiating partner.
Israel is in the most interesting position. Of course if Israel does nothing it benefits (and has been benefitting) in the short term while the two Palestinian factions do their best to destroy each other. However, in the long term Israel faces some hard choices. Presumably now that Abbas has formed a government that does not include Hamas (in other words, a government which other than himself was never elected by the people) Israel is free to negotiate (since they had refused to negotiate with a government including Hamas because of Hamas' refusal to recognize Israel).
To begin with the Palestinian authority and Israel, which recognized each other after the Oslo accords, are willing to reiterate that agreement, but what next? Israel has built settlements in the past and is willing to dismantle them as they did in Gaza-- but what happened in Gaza, which has provided a base for rocket and mortar attacks and resulted in Israel re-invading certain areas in brief forays (as well as a protracted incursion last summer) suggests that simply dismantling the settlements as good-will gestures is as likely as not to simply turn them into launching pads for rockets aimed at Israeli population centers. Israel may indeed dismantle settlements, but the price is likely to be steep-- likely including acceptance of the Israeli border wall (which I oppose incidentally-- for the same reasons I oppose a border wall on the Mexican border-- but realistically, the Israelis are unlikely to tear it down given its record of stopping suicide bombers) and possibly some concessions in other areas-- more on that later. However, it is clearly to Israel's advantage to have a secure border along the West Bank area, just as Israel presently has secure borders along two borders which were once battle zones: Israel's borders with Jordan and Egypt. So Israel does have a motivation to reach an agreement that will allow a Fatah led state to come together and develop economically and politically. However, even if an accord is reached, there is still the thorny issue of what to do about east Jerusalem. Both sides claim it as their capitol, and the one thing that Jews, Muslims and Christians agree on is that the temple mount (now adorned with the mosque of Omar, the third holiest site in Islam) is holy ground. The holiest site in Judaism is the western wall of the temple of Herod, the same temple where Jesus preached and which was destroyed by the Romans in A.D. 70. I suspect that in the absence of other considerations, Israel would retain control over the holy sites only because of the fact of the matter, that Israel controls them now and won't give them up, and this would be part of the price Abbas would have to agree to in exchange for the dismantling of settlements elsewhere. However, the Israelis could offer to put portions under joint control, IF they had a real reason why they needed to gain goodwill, especially from West Bank Palestinians. And there is a reason they will.
The reason is quite plain. Israel will certainly be fighting a two front war in the very near future. In the past, Israel's reputation for military effectiveness saved it from actually having to fight any real wars since the end of the Lebanon invasion in 1982. But last summer, Hezbollah fought Israel to a draw. In the politics of the Middle East, that equals a victory for Hezbollah and a defeat for Israel. Hezbollah, which fired thousands of rockets all over northern and north-central Israel in last year's war has re-armed themselves and will sooner or later (with 'sooner' being more likely) go to war again with Israel. Not surprisingly, as we've seen recently, al-Qaeda also quickly has gotten into the scene, with Lebanese army units fighting to dislodge them from bases in southern Lebanon-- a place where until a few months ago al-Qaeda had no interest in.
However, with Hamas now firmly in control of the Gaza strip, we can anticipate that such a war will be a two front war. Hamas remains committed absolutely to the destruction of Israel so it is a certainty that at some point, they will use the complete control of the area which they now have to organize and conduct a concerted attack on Israel. It is hard to imagine that whether Hezbollah or Hamas attacks first, the other won't quickly join in. Or perhaps Israel, knowing this will happen, will attack both Hamas and Hezbollah directly-- hoping to gain enough militarily from a first strike to offset the political price they would pay for it.
And that is where Fatah and Abbas' opportunity comes in. They could of course mount an attack as well on Israel, but unlike Hamas and Hezbollah, Fatah's roots as a guerilla organization are long since past, and they would be quickly crushed by the Israeli army if they were so foolish. However, they could extract a high price from Israel in exchange for remaining neutral (since the last thing that Israel would want while fighting a two-front war would be for it to become a three-front war-- with the everpresent concern that Syria could also open a fourth front). In particular, that might be the card that Fatah would need to get rid of all the settlements, and possibly gain a joint control agreement over east Jerusalem. At the same time, a Palestinian authority which remained neutral (including reigning in its military arm, the al-Aqsa martyr's brigade) while Israel was fighting another major war would go a long way towards convincing Israel that the time was right for full Palestinian statehood.
It has been said of the Palestinians in the past that 'they never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.' Of course that was when Yassir Arafat was leading them from disappointment to disappointment to disappointment. The next few months will tell whether Abbas will be able to seize the opportunity and create a peaceful and stable state in the West Bank or go the way of Arafat before him.
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